Due Process-A Substantive Due Process Attack on the Price-Anderson Act-Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. by unknown
BYU Law Review
Volume 1978 | Issue 3 Article 10
9-1-1978
Due Process-A Substantive Due Process Attack on
the Price-Anderson Act-Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Energy and Utilities Law Commons
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Due Process-A Substantive Due Process Attack on the Price-Anderson Act-Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 1978
BYU L. Rev. 756 (1978).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1978/iss3/10
Due Process-A SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS A'ITACK ON THE PRICE- 
ANDERSON ACT-Duke Power Co. u.  Carolina Environmental 
Study Group, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978). 
Duke Power Company obtained permits from the United 
States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)' authorizing the con- 
struction of two atomic powered electric generating p l a n k 2  These 
plants are located on popular recreational lakes within a twenty- 
mile radius of Charlotte, North C a r ~ l i n a . ~  A number of residents 
in the vicinity of the two plants, along with other concerned indi- 
viduals, joined with the Carolina Environmental Study Group, 
Inc., to oppose Duke Power's construction and operation of these 
nuclear power plants.' 
The Price-Anderson Act,5 adopted in 1957, sets an upper 
limit of $560 million on the aggregate liability of Nuclear Regula- 
tory Commission (NRC-the current successor of the AEC) 
licensees for damages arising out of a single nuclear incident! In 
the event of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrenceM7 the Act re- 
1. The Atomic Energy commission was created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 
ch. 724, § 2, 60 Stat. 755 (current version at  42 U.S.C. $ 8  2011-2296 (1976)). The AEC 
was abolished and its regulatory functions transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commis- 
sion (NRC) pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 
Stat. 1233 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§  5801-5891 (1976)). This Case Note will refer to the 
Commission as the NRC except in those circumstances in which reference to the AEC is 
necessary to preserve the historical context. 
2. Construction permits are issued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 4 2235 (1976). 
3. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc. v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203,206 (W.D.N.C. 1977), 
reo'd, 98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978). 
4. Id. a t  205. 
5. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified at  42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976)). 
6. 42 U.S.C. !j 2210(e) (1976). See notes 19-30 and accompanying text infra for a more 
detailed explanation of the provisions of the Act. 
7. The term "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" is defined at  42 U.S.C. 8 2014(j) 
(1976) : 
The term "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" means any event causing a 
discharge or dispersal of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material from its 
intended place of confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radiation levels 
offsite, which the Commission determines to be substantial, and which the 
Commission determines has resulted or will probably result in substantial dam- 
ages to persons offsite or property offsite. Any determination by the Commission 
that such an event has, or has not, occurred shall be final and conclusive, and 
no other official or any court shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such 
determination. The Commission shall establish criteria in writing setting forth 
the basis upon which such determination shall be made. As used in this subsec- 
tion, "offsite" means away from "the location" or "the contract location" as 
defined in the applicable Commission indemnity agreement, entered into pur- 
suant to section 2210 of this title. 
Specific regulations as to the minimum levels of offsite radiation and damages that must 
be met before the NRC may declare an incident an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" 
are found at  10 C.F.R. 0 0 140.81-.85 (1978). 
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quires NRC licensees to waive 4 1  issues or defenses of negligence, 
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and governmental or 
charitable i r n m ~ n i t y . ~  
The Carolina Environmental Study Group brought an action 
in federal district court against the AEC and Duke Power Com- 
pany seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Price- 
Anderson Act upper limit on aggregate liability. The district 
court held that the Act was in violation of the due process clause 
of the fifth amendment "because it allows the destruction of the 
property or the lives of those ayfected by a nuclear catastrophe 
without reasonable certainty that the victims will be justly com- 
pen~ated."~ On direct appeal to the Supreme CourtlO,the lower 
court judgment was unanimously reversed." The Court held that 
the Act was not violative of the due process clause since it was a 
legitimate, and not arbitrary or irrational, attempt to serve the 
dual purpose of protecting the public and encouraging the devel- 
opment of nuclear power.12 
A. Legislative History and Purpose of the Price-Anderson Act 
The responsibility for the early development of nuclear en- 
ergy in the United States rested entirely with the federal govern- 
ment, primarily with the armed forces. Following World War I1 
and after much debate on the desirability of allowing private 
industry to avail itself of this potentially great source of energy, 
the Atomic Energy Act of 194613 and the Atomic Energy Act of 
195414 were passed permitting the private sector to develop nu- 
clear energy for peaceful purposes under strict regulation by the 
AEC. 'The Price-Anderson Act was an effort to reconcile compet- 
8. 42 U.S.C. Ej 2210(n) (1976). 
9. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc. v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203,222 (W.D.N.C. 1977) 
reu'd, 98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978). 
10. An.appea1 can be taken directly to the Supreme Court if a district court holds 
an act of Congress unconstitutional in a suit to which an agency of the United States is a 
party. 28 U.S.C. Ej 1252 (1976). 
11. Although all nine Justices concurred in the result, Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, 
and Stevens wrote separate opinions indicating that they would have reversed on the 
threshold issues of standing, ripeness, or subject-matter jurisdiction and would have never 
considered the due process issue. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 
98 S. Ct. 2620,2641-46 (1978) (separate opinions concurring in the result only by Stewart, 
Rehnquist, & Stevens, JJ.). 
12. Id. a t  2635 (majority opinion). 
13. Ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §Ej 2011-2296 (1976)). 
14. Ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (codified a t  42 U.S.C. $8  2011-2296 (1976)). 
15. Wilson, Nuclear Liability and the Price-Anderson Act, 12 FORUM 612, 612-13 
(1977). 
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ing interests that became apparent after the initial decision was 
made to turn over development of the peacetime use of nuclear 
power to private industry. The nature of these interests is readily 
ascertainable from the stated objectives of the Act: (1) to assure 
the public of the availability of funds sufficient to satisfy liability 
claims arising out of a catastrophic nuclear accident, and (2) to 
set an upper limit on the aggregate dollar amount to be paid in 
compensation for these claims, thus removing the impediment to 
private sector participation caused by a fear of unlimited liability 
in the event of a major catastrophe.16 
The limited protection provided by the Act would have ex- 
pired on August 1, 1967, approximately ten years from the date 
of its passage? The Act, however, has been modified and ex- 
tended twice for additional ten-year periods.l8 Besides serving to 
prolong the life of Price-Anderson protection, these congressional 
extensions provided an opportunity for periodic review and signif- 
icant amendment of the Act. 
B. Mechanics of the Price-Anderson Act 
The Price-Anderson Act creates two sources of funds for sat- 
isfying liability claims arising out of the activities of NRC 
licensees. The licensee is responsible for the "first level of finan- 
cial protection," defined as the maximum amount of liability 
insurance available from private  source^.'^ The NRC is in essence 
responsible for the second level since it is required to then indem- 
nify the licensee for compensatory damages paid out in excess of 
- - 
16. AEC Staff Study of the Price-Anderson Act: Part I, ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 205,206- 
07 (1974). The Price-Anderson Act added the following statement to the congressional 
findings of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act: 
In order to protect the public and to encourage the development of the 
atomic energy industry, in the interests of the general welfare and of the com- 
mon defense and security, the United States may make funds available for a 
portion of the damages suffered by the public from nuclear incidents, and may 
limit the liability of those persons liable for such losses. 
42 U.S.C. 5 2012(i) (1976). 
17. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 5 4, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 9 2210 
(1976)). 
18. The Act was first extended to Aug. 1, 1977, Pub. L. No. 89-210, 5 4, 79 Stat. 855 
(1965); and later to Aug. 1, 1987, Act of Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, 5 5, 89 Stat. 
1111 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 9 2210 (1976)). 
19. 42 U.S.C. 5 2210(b) (1976). The amount of protection required in 1957 was $60 
million. The current level of protection required for major reactor sites is $125 million. 
Lowenstein, The Price-Anderson Act: An Imaginative Approach to Public Liability 
Concerns, 12 FORUM 594, 599 (1977). The applicable regulations are found in 10 C.F.R. 
09 140.11-.12 (1978). 
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the initial level of financial p ro te~t ion .~~ An upper limit of $560 
million is set on the amount of aggregate liability arising from any 
one nuclear incidentn2I n exchange for the indemnification agree- 
ment, the NRC is authorized to collect a substantial fee from all 
licensees covered by the 
To ensure that all potential claims are given adequate con- 
sideration, the Act allows application by any indemnitor or other 
interested person to the federal district court having venue in 
bankruptcy over the location of a nuclear incident. Upon a find- 
ing that total liability to the public will likely exceed the maxi- 
mum limit, the district court is granted great latitude in the 
administration of the payment of claims, including t h ~  power to 
apportion payments from the $560 million liability fund among 
claimants while reserving some funds for the payment of future 
Shortly after Congress voted the Price-Anderson Act its first 
ten-year extension, the Act was amended to include the waiver 
of defenses," thereby imposing on those protected by the Act a 
burden of strict statutory liability.25 Under current provisions of 
the Act, the defendant NRC licensee must waive: 
(i) any issue or defense as to conduct of the claimant or fault of 
persons indemnified, (ii) any issue or defense as to charitable or 
20. 42 U.S.C. (j 2210(c) (1976). 
21. Id.. (j 2210(e). 
22. Id. (j 2210(f). This fee is not insignificant. One commentator relates that 
the government collects an annual indemnity fee from each power reactor li- 
censee. This fee is assessed on a flat basis of $30 per thousand kilowatts of 
thermal energy authorized in the license; since a typical modern power reactor 
has a power level of about 3000 to 3300 MWth (corresponding to about 1000 to 
1100 MW), the annual indemnity fee for such plants is about $90,000 to $99,000. 
This fee is not a premium and has no actuarial basis. Furthermore, although 
about three-fourths of the insurance premiums collected in the years 1956-67 
have been returned by the nuclear liability insurance pools to policyholders 
because of the industry's safety record, the indemnity fees are not returnable. 
. . . [?lo date the government has collected millions of dollars in indemn- 
ity fees, but has not paid out one dollar in claims . . . . 
Lowenstein, supra note 19, at 600-01. 
23. 42 U.S.C. (j 2210(0) (1976). 
24. Act of Oct. 13, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891 (codified a t  42 U.S.C. 8 
2210(n) (1976)). 
25. The waiver provisions are not effective until the Commission determines that 
certain minimum thresholds of damages are surpassed. The threshold levels are set out 
in 10 C.F.R. (j(j 140.84-.85 (1978). If damages do not exceed these limits, plaintiffs must 
rely on common law theories of recovery. This aspect of the Act has generated considerable 
comment. See, e.g., Comment, The Irradiated Plaintiff: Tort Recovery Outside &ice- 
Anderson, 6 ENVT'L L. 859 (1976); Note, The "Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence" 
Threshold and Uncompensated Injury Under the Rice-Anderson Act, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 
360 (1974). 
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governmental immunity, and (iii) any issue or defense based on 
any statute of limitations if suit is instituted within three years 
from the date on which the claimant first knew, or reasonably 
could have known, of his injury or damage and the cause 
thereof, but in no event more than twenty years after the date 
of the nuclear in~ident.~" 
The second ten-year extension of Price-Anderson protection 
brought further changes. Congress amended the Act to create a 
scheme whereby the indemnification now provided by the NRC 
will be replaced by a system of deferred premiums imposed di- 
rectly on all NRC licensees in the event of a nuclear incident 
where aggregate liability exceeds the amount of the primary level 
of financial protection required of each licen~ee.~' The 1975 
26. 42 U.S.C. # 2210(n)(l) (1976). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (1976). The deferred premium system created by the 1975 
amendment is summarized by one commentator: 
The amendment provides for two major changes: 
1. gradual substitution of industry financed indemnity for govern- 
ment indemnity above the amount of insurance available and, 
2. an increase in the limit of liability. 
The statute provides for a phasing out of governmental indemnity through 
a provision requiring that in the event of a nuclear incident which results in 
damages in excess of the base layer of insurance (now $125 million), each 
licensee will be assessed a prorated share of the excess damages (a "deferred 
premium"). The amendment authorized NRC to set the level of the deferred 
premium at  no less than $2 million and no more than $5 million per facility. 
Under the bill, the NRC will continue to provide indemnity for payment of 
damages exceeding the combined primary insurance layer, and the secondary 
(or deferred premium) layer up to a total of $560 million. As the secondary layer 
increases, however, i t  will gradually replace the government indemnity. The 
date at  which this occurs will depend primarily on the amount set as the de- 
ferred premium and on the rate at  which new power reactors come into licensed 
operation. 
The table below shows when the replacement of government indemnity 
would occur assuming deferred premiums of $2, 3 ,4  or 5 million, and assuming 
174 reactors with operating licenses in 1985. 
operating reactor deferred premiums 
[Dollar amounts i n  millions] 
In other words, assuming a deferred premium of $4 million and 174 reactors 
licensed for operation, the government indemnity would be eliminated by 1982 
and, thereafter, the limit on liability will be increased as additional reactors are 
licensed to operate. At a deferred premium level of $4 million per reactor, the 
overall limit would reach a billion dollars in about 1988, assuming 265 reactors. 
Lowenstein, supra note 19, a t  599-600 (footnotes omitted). The NRC has recently set the 
figure for the deferred premium at  $5 million. 10 C.F.R. Q 140.11(a)(4) (1978). 
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amendments provide that the upper limit of aggregate liability 
may be increased to the extent that the fund created by the 
deferred premium plan, when added to the initial level of finan- 
cial protection required, exceeds $560 million.28 Furthermore, 
these most recent amendments include a proviso requiring Con- 
gress to step in and take whatever action may be necessary to 
"protect the public"29 in the event of a catastrophic nuclear inci- 
dent where the limit of aggregate liability might be exceeded.30 
C. Reasonable, Certain, and Adequate Provision for 0 btaining 
Compensation 
In the case of Cherokee Nation v .  Southern Kansas 
Railway, 31 the Supreme Court indicated that the just compensa- 
tion clause of the fifth amendment32 requires that holders of 
vested property interests be given "reasonable, certain and ade- 
quate provision for obtaining compensation" before their inter- 
ests can be disturbed by state-mandated action.33 In this case, 
Congress, by virtue of the eminent domain power of the federal 
government, had granted to the railway company a right-of-way 
through Cherokee Nation lands. When the parties failed to agree 
on the price to be paid for the right-of-way, three independent 
appraisers were appointed to value the land according to the 
statutory plan. Before proceeding with construction the railway 
company was required to pay into the district court double the 
amount of the appraisers' average figure, the actual amount of 
compensation to be determined a t  a trial de novo in district court. 
A major issue in the case concerned the question of whether the 
Cherokee Nation was entitled to full compensation prior to the 
time its property interests were disturbed. This issue arose be- 
cause plaintiffs feared the railway company might become insol- 
vent before the lower court could reach a conclusion as to the 
value of the land. The Supreme Court found that the fifth amend- 
ment required not prior compensation but only "reasonable, cer- 
28. 42 U . S . C .  2210(e) (1976). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. These 1975 amendments were apparently in response to public criticism of the 
Act. Critics generally pointed to the possibility of uncompensated injuries and to the 
"subsidy" afforded the nuclear power industry by the indemnification arrangement. See, 
e .g ,  Collier, Are the "No Recourse" R-ovisions of the Price-Anderson Act Valid or Uncon- 
stitutional?, 4 Hous. L. REV. 236 (1966). 
31. 135 U.S. 641 (1890). 
32. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation." 
33. 135 U.S. at 659. 
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tain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation." The 
Court then added the caveat that absolute certainty of compensa- 
tion could not, however, be reasonably required since such a re- 
quirement would be, in the words of the Court, "impra~ticable."~~ 
The Cherokee Nation principle tha t  the Constitution re- 
quires reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining 
compensation has been applied consistently by the courts in cases 
involving governmental powers of eminent domain.35 Most re- 
cently, reference was made to this principle by the Supreme 
Court in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases.36 The 
Reorganization Act Cases arose out of the recent national rail 
crisis and Congress' attempt to deal with that crisis through the 
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973.37 In effect, the 1973 Act 
required holders of certain railroad properties to convey their 
interests to CONRAIL38 in exchange for CONRAIL securities and 
federally guaranteed United States Railway Association (USRA) 
 obligation^.^^ Plaintiffs in the action contended that the Rail Act 
effected a "taking of rail properties" without the reasonable, cer- 
tain, and adequate provisions for obtaining compensation re- 
quired by the Cherokee Nation case." The Supreme Court disa- 
greed. The opinion primarily vindicates the broad authority of 
Congress to take any measure necessary to serve the best interests 
of the public when an entire industry, such as the railroad, is 
faced with financial collapse. After lengthy discussion of whether 
the Act did in fact result in a "taking" analogous to a taking by 
eminent domain, the Court found that the "reasonable, certain 
and adequate" standard was applicable. Employing this test, the 
Court held that the provisions of the Rail Act itself, together with 
the availability of supplementary Tucker Act" remedies, were 
sufficient to meet the Cherokee Nation test.42 
The Supreme Court's reasoning in the Reorganization Act 
Cases emphasizes the point that the Cherokee Nation principle 
is necessarily limited in its application to situations in which the 
eminent domain powers of the state, or reasonably similar pow- 
-- -- - 
34. Id. at 660. 
35. See, e.g., FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U S .  99, 121-22 (1960); United 
States v. Carmack, 329 U S .  230,240 (1946); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U S .  380,402-03 (1895). 
36. 419 U S .  102 (1974). 
37. 45 U.S.C. $ $  701-793 (Supp. IV 1974). 
38. Consolidated Rail Corporation (CONRAIL) was established by the Act. 45 U.S.C. 
0 741 (Supp. IV 1974). 
39. The USRA was also created by the 1973 Act. 45 U.S.C. $ 711 (Supp. IV 1974). 
40. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U S .  at 118. 
41. 28 U.S.C. 5 1491 (1976). 
42. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 136, 155. 
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ers, are being exercised." This is understandable in light of the 
fact that the Cherokee Nation Court derived its "reasonable, cer- 
tain and adequate" standard from the just compensation clause 
of the fifth amendment, which on its face is only applicable when 
there has been a taking of private property for public use. 
D. Prospective Modification of Common Law Rights and 
Remedies 
Though the government may not take property without just 
compensation, innumerable cases hold that the state may, by 
legislative action, prospectively modify or even eliminate a com- 
mon law right or remedy." In particular, a legislature may create, 
modify, or eliminate an entire scheme of liability and compensa- 
tion as long as it protects vested rights and stays within constitu- 
tional  limitation^.^^ 
In Mondou v.  New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad46 
the Supreme Court reviewed a constitutional challenge to the 
Railroad Employers' Liability Act." The Act abrogated the com- 
mon law fellow servant ruled8 and severely limited the employer's 
resort to the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption 
of risk. In upholding the validity of the statutory scheme, the 
Court relied heavily on the following language: 
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the 
common law. That is only one of the forms of municipal law, 
and is no more sacred than any other. Rights of property which 
have been created by the common law cannot be taken away 
43. For the Court's discussion of the "erosion taking" and "conveyance taking" issues 
and its struggle to determine whether these issues are sufficiently analogous to a taking 
of private property for public use so as to bring into play the body of law dealing with the 
just compensation clause, see 419 U.S. a t  122-56. 
44. See, e.g., Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 76 (1915); Mondou 
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. (Second Employer's Liability Cases), 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1912); 
Martin v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 203 U.S. 284,295 (1906); Hurtado v. California, 110 U S .  
516, 532-33 (1884); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876); Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441 
F.2d 1239, 1242 (5th Cir. 1971); Sparks v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 411,416 (W.D. 
Okla. 1977). 
45. E.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188,197-98 (1917); Mondou v. New 
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1,49-50 (1911); Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441 F.2d 1239,1242 
(5th Cir. 1971); Sparks v. Wyeth Labs, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 411, 416 (W.D. Okla. 1977). 
"Vested" is used in the traditional sense to refer to a right or claim which has accrued or 
been perfected. Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441 F.2d 1239, 1242 (5th Cir. 1971). 
46. 223 U.S. 1 (1911). 
47. Ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (current version a t  45 U.S.C. $ 4  51-58 (1970)). 
48. The Court in Mondou referred to the fellow servant rule as "[tlhe rule that the 
negligence of one employee resulting in injury to another was not to be attributed to their 
common employer." 223 U.S. at 49. 
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without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may 
be changed at  the will . . . of the legislature, unless prevented 
by constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great office of statutes 
is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, 
and to adapt it to the changes of times and circumstances.49 
A few years later, the Court in New York Central Railroad 
v. WhiteM outlined a similar analytical framework for reviewing 
comprehensive modifications of liability and compensation rules. 
In White the Supreme Court considered the New York workmen's 
compensation law.51 After first reiterating its Mondou position,52 
the Court expressly held that a legislature may prospectively 
modify an existing body of rules governing liability and compen- 
sation, especially if the statute provides a "reasonably just substi- 
t ~ t e . " ~ ~  A court need only determine whether the substitute 
method of compensation falls within the limits of permissible 
state action.54 
In making this determination the Court announced that it 
would look at the proposed scheme and consider only whether it 
is "arbitrary and unreasonable, from the standpoint of natural 
justice."55 The heavy burden of proving the unconstitutionality of 
the statute rested with the party challenging the statutory 
scheme. Employing a balancing test, the Court sought to deter- 
mine whether the benefits to potential defendants provided by an 
absolute upper limit on damages were offset by significant advan- 
tages to potential plaintiffs. The Court found that the certainty 
of recovery and the waiver by the employer of various common 
law defenses granted the plaintiffs sufficient advantages to make 
the balance a fair 
In Crane v. Hahlo5' the Supreme Court upheld a legislative 
modification of the procedure for determining damage awards 
resulting from roadway improvements made by the City of New 
York. Once again, the Court focused on the substitute remedy by 
declaring that "so long as a substantial and efficient remedy re- 
49. Id. at 50. 
50. 243 U.S. 188 (1917). 
51. 1914 N.Y. Laws, chs. 41, 316; 1913 N.Y. Laws, ch. 816 (current version at N.Y. 
WORK. COMP. LAW $ 4  1-401 (McKinney 1965)). 
52. 243 U.S. at 198. 
53. Id. at 201-02. 
54. Id. at 202. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 201-04. 
57. 258 U.S. 142 (1922). 
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mains or is provided due process of law is not denied by a legisla- 
tive change. "58 
An important shift in the Court's framework of analysis can 
be detected in the case of Crowell v. B e n ~ o n , ~ ~  which involved a 
challenge to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen- 
sation ActeBO In reviewing the due process issue, the Court care- 
fully distinguished between the procedural due process and the 
substantive due process aspects of the case." Relying primarily 
on White, the Court summarily dismissed the substantive due 
process attack.62 A much more detailed consideration of the pro- 
cedural due process argument evidenced that the Court was a t  
least willing to entertain the notion that such statutorily created 
schemes were open to attack on procedural grounds? Ultimately 
the Court upheld the statute, though a lengthy dissent, focusing 
primarily on the procedural due process issue, was filed by Justice 
Brandeis, joined by Justices Stone and R o b e r t ~ . ~ ~  The Court's 
summary dismissal of the substantive due process challenge and 
its extensive discussion of the procedural due process issue in 
Crowell indicate that legislative modifications of liability and 
compensation rules might well be subject to challenge on proce- 
dural due process grounds. A substantive due process challenge, 
however, will be unavailing as long as the legislatively created 
substitute is not arbitrary and unreas~nable.~~ 
In sum, this line of cases produced several overriding princi- 
ples that have been applied in later federal court  proceeding^:^^ 
(1) common law rights and remedies may be modified by legisla- 
tive action as long as the action operates prospectively and affects 
58. Id. a t  147. 
59. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
60. Ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§  901-950 (1976)). 
61. 285 U.S. a t  37. The procedural due process issue concerned the question of 
whether the Act should provide for a trial de novo to determine the facts in the event that 
a party did not agree with the facts as found by the administrative agency having responsi- 
bility for making the initial award. The substantive due process issue involved the ques- 
tion of whether the substitute compensation scheme created by the Act was arbitrary and 
unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional. The Court upheld the Act on both issues. 
Id. at 37-65. 
62. Id. at 41-42. 
63. Id. at 42-65. 
64. Id. a t  65-95 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
65. Id. at 41-42. 
66. E.g., Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1971); Swanson v. Bates, 170 
F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1948); Sparks v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 411 (W.D. Okla. 
1977); Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 338 
(S.D.N.Y. 1944). 
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only nonvested claims of right;" (2) the modification or abolition 
of nonvested rights is particularly justifiable if the legislature has 
provided a reasonably just substitute remedy;" (3) the legisla- 
tively created substitute scheme will pass constitutional muster 
as long as it is not "arbitrary and unreasonable, from the stand- 
point of natural justiceMBg and meets procedural due process re- 
qu i rement~;~~ and (4) in determining the arbitrariness and unrea- 
sonableness of the statute, the Court will balance the advantages 
to potential defendants on the one hand with the advantages to 
potential plaintiffs on the othere71 
A. The District Court's Decision 
In the case at hand the district court concluded that the 
Price-Anderson Act did in fact violate the due process clause by 
allowing "the destruction of the property or the lives of those 
affected by nuclear catastrophe without reasonable certainty that 
the victims will be justly c~mpensated."~~ The court identified 
three considerations that led to its conclusion: (1) the limited 
amount of recovery allowed by the Act is not rationally related 
to the potential losses;73 (2) the Act tends to encourage irresponsi- 
67. See, e.g., Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1971). 
While conceding that one can have no vested interest in any rule of common 
law, these cases emphasized that a right created under such a rule which has 
been perfected could not be taken away without being violative of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendents. . . . On the other hand, one cannot be heard to ques- 
tion the sufficiency of due process if the rule of law, which merely held the 
potential to create a property right, was changed before any right vested. 
Id. a t  1242 (citations omitted). 
68. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201-02 (1917). The District Court 
for the Western District of Oklahoma emphasized this point in the following statement: 
Moreover, while the prospective direct remedy of an injured person against 
a manufacturer has been abolished, an alternative, efficacious remedy against 
the United States is substituted. Such a replacement or substitution of reme- 
dies, while perhaps not technically necessary for due process, is nonetheless even 
more indicative of the satisfaction of due process requirements . . . . 
Sparks v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 411, 416 (1977) (emphasis added). 
69. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 202 (1916). Speaking of the power 
to substitute remedies, the Court in a later case concluded: 
In the exercise of that power and to satisfy a public need, a state may choose 
the remedy best adapted, in the' legislative judgment, to protect the interests 
concerned, provided its choice is not unreasonable or arbitrary, and the proce- 
dure it adopts satisfies the constitutional requirements of reasonable notice and 
opportunity to be heard. 
Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931). 
70. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 42-65 (1932). 
71. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201-04 (1916). 
72. 431 F. Supp. a t  222. 
73. Id. 
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bility on the part of builders and operators of reactor sites;74 and, 
(3) there is no quid pro quo in the "exchange of burdens and 
benefits" between defendants and potential future  plaintiff^.'^ 
The district court treated the first point by noting that in the 
event of a major catastrophe, damages to life and property might 
well be many times the amount set as the statutory limit.'"n 
discussing the second point the court concluded that contrary to 
the purpose of the Atomic Energy Act, the removal of the spectre 
of unlimited liability encouraged irresponsibility in the construc- 
tion and operation of nuclear reactors." 
The court devoted most of its efforts to discussing the third 
point. The court employed a balancing test to determine whether 
the advantage to NRC licensees of the statutorily fixed limit on 
liability was offset by the advantages to plaintiffs of a certainty 
of recovery, a more prompt release of funds, the extension of some 
short statutes of limitation, and the waiver of common law defen- 
s e ~ . ' ~  The court concluded its balancing test by citing Cherokee 
Nation and the Regional Rail Reorganization A et Cases, stating 
that  the Price-Anderson Act fell short of providing the 
"reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining com- 
pensation" that due process requires." 
B. The Supreme Court's Analysis 
The opinion of the Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice 
Burger, treated the due process issue only after an extensive dis- 
cussion of the threshold issues of standing, ripeness, and subject 
matter jurisdicti~n.~~' Three of the Justices wrote opinions con- 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 223. 
76. Id. at 222. 
77. Id. at 222-23. 
78. Id. at 223. 
79. Id. at  224. 
80. 98 S. Ct. a t  2628-35. Both the district court h d  the Supreme Court devoted 
considerable portions of their opinions to the threshold issues of standing and ripeness. 
98 S. Ct. at 2630-35; 431 F. Supp. a t  218-22. Plaintiffs premised their standing to sue on 
the contention that the nuclear plants, when operational, would damage them by releasing 
into the atmosphere a small measure of radioactive material and by increasing the water 
temperature in adjacent lakes. They further asserted that although the probability of a 
major catastrophe is small, it is sufficient to create a present fear and apprehension among 
residents of the area. Finally, they argued that in the event of such a catastrophe, the $560 
million limit on liability established by the Act might preclude some injured parties from 
being fully compensated. The district court made findings that essentially embodied the 
plaintiffs' arguments. 431 F. Supp. a t  219-20. 
On the standing i s y e  the Supreme Court noted that to establish the requisite per- 
sonal stake in the action the plaintiffs must show a "distinct and palpable injury" (citing 
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curring only in the judgment, indicating that they would have 
dismissed the case on the threshold issues and never reached the 
merits? 
Upon reaching the due process issue, the Court found it nec- 
essary to first determine the appropriate standard of review.82 In 
their appeal, Duke Power Company and the NRC argued that the 
Price-Anderson Act should be considered under traditionally def- 
erential standards which accord a presumption of constitution- 
ality to congressionally enacted economic regulations in the ab- 
sence of proof of arbitrariness or irrationality." The Carolina En- 
vironmental Study Group, on the other hand, recommended a 
less deferential standard on the ground that the Act jeopardized 
rights which were "far more important" than the interests consid- 
ered in traditional substantive due process cases.84 After citing 
the legislative history of the Act and concluding that the Price- 
Anderson liability limitation was "a classic example of an eco- 
nomic regulat i~n,"~~ the Supreme Court accepted the appellants' 
arguments. 
The Court then considered in turn each of the three factors 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)) and a "fairly traceable" causal connect.ion 
between the injury and the challenged conduct (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolit,an 
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977)). 98 S. Ct. a t  2630. The Court found t.hat the 
"immediate" adverse environmental and aesthetic consequences of the thermal pollution 
of the two lakes constituted sufficiently distinct and palpable injury. Id. a t  26'31. In 
addition, i t  found a causal link based upon the district court's finding that but for t.he 
protection of the Act the nuclear power plants in question would never be completed or 
operated. Id. a t  2631-32 (citing 431 F. Supp. a t  219-20). 
In addition, the Court refused to require the plaintiffs to demonstrate a connection 
between the injuries they claimed and the constitutional rights being asserted. Id. at 26'33. 
Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U S .  83, 102 (1968) (requiring plaintiffs in a taxpayer suit, to 
establish a subject matter nexus between the right asserted and the injury alleged). The 
Court observed that if such a showing were required, an attack on the Price-Anderson 
liability limit could not be maintained prior to the occurrence of an accident result.ing in 
damages in excess of the statutory limit. 98 S. Ct. a t  2633 n.23. 
In determining that the issue was ripe for adjudication, the Supreme Court noted t,hat 
delaying decision on the constitutionality of the Act would defeat the Act's purpose of 
eliminating doubts and fears on the part of private developers of nuclear power. The Court 
further commented that "all parties would be adversely affected by a decision t.o defer 
definitive resolution of the constitutional validity vel non of the Price-Anderson Act.." Id. 
at  2635. 
81. Four separate opinions were filed in this case: Chief Justice Burger wr0t.e the 
opinion of the Court; Justice Stewart concurred in the result (plaintiffs have no st.anding 
to sue); Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in the judgment. (lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction); Justice Stevens also wrote a separate concurrence (no stand- 
ing, issues are not ripe for adjudication, no subject matter jurisdiction). 
82. 98 S. Ct. a t  2635-36. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at  2636. 
85. Id. 
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the district court identified in support of its conclusion that the 
Act violated the due process clause. As to the contention that the 
amount of recovery is not rationally related to the potential 
losses, the Court conceded that in light of the uncertainty con- 
cerning the extent of damage that could result from a major nu- 
clear incident, the choice of any figure as an absolute upper limit 
on liability would necessarily represent a somewhat arbitrary de- 
cision.' The Court concluded, however, that considering the re- 
moteness of the possibility of an accident involving damages in 
excess of the limitation and the current statutory mandate for 
Congress to step in and take appropriate action should such a 
possibility materialize, Congress' decision to limit liability in 
order to promote development of nuclear power was neither arbi- 
trary nor irrational." The limitation figure was also found to be 
reasonable and not violative of due process.88 
The Supreme Court then dismissed, with two pointed obser- 
vations, the district court's contention that the Price-Anderson 
Act encourages irresponsibility on the part of builders and owners 
of nuclear power plants. First, nothing in the Act releases any 
potential indemnitee from complying with the strict rules and 
regulations of the Atomic Energy Act that control the review of 
applications for construction permits or operating licenses." Sec- 
ond, the risk of potential bankruptcy or severe financial loss re- 
sulting from damage to the power plant itself is certainly an 
incentive to the owner to avoid the irresponsibility feared by the 
district court. 
The Court also disagreed with the district court's third con- 
tention that there was not a sufficient quid pro quo for the ban 
on recovery above the specified limit. The Court emphasized that 
in fulfillment of its objective to "protect the p ~ b l i c " ~  the Act 
assured at least a $560 million recovery fund and in addition 
expressly required Congress to take further appropriate action in 
the event of a major nuclear catastrophe." The Court found that 
these provisions constitute a reasonably just substitute for poten- 
tial plaintiffs' common law remedies, especially in light of the 
very real possibility that the resources of a potential defendant 
86. Id. at 2637. 
87. Id.. at 2637-38. 
88. Id. at 2638. 
89. Id. See also the Supreme Court's discussion of NRC regulation in Vermont Yan- 
kee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 98 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (1978). 
90. 98 S. Ct. at 2640. 
91. Id. at 2639-40. 
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would be exhausted at a figure much lower than the $560 million 
fund guaranteed by the Act. 
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the waiver of defen- 
ses required by the Acta benefits potential plaintiffs in a signifi- 
cant way by eliminating the delay and uncertainty that would 
result if it were necessary to litigate the question of liability after 
a major accident.93 The Court added that common law strict lia- 
bility was subject to exceptions for acts of God or of third parties 
whereas no such exceptions exist under the Price-Anderson Act?' 
In summing up its position on the quid pro quo issue the Court 
declared: 
The Price-Anderson Act not only provides a reasonable, prompt 
and equitable mechanism for compensating victims of a cata- 
strophic nuclear incident, it also guarantees a level of net com- 
pensation generally exceeding that recoverable in private litiga- 
tion. Moreover, the Act contains an explicit congressional com- 
mitment to take further action to aid victims of a nuclear acci- 
dent in the event that the $560 million ceiling on liability is 
exceeded. This panoply of remedies and guarantees is at the 
least a reasonably just substitute for the common-law rights 
replaced by the Due Process Clause. Nothing more is required 
by the Due Process Clause.s5 
After summarily dismissing any challenge based on the equal 
protection clause," the Court pronounced its final judgment, re- 
versing the decision of the district court and remanding for pro- 
ceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.g7 
III. ANALYSIS 
It is important to note at the outset that both the district 
court and the Supreme Court chose to confine their due process 
analyses to the question of substantive rather than procedural 
violations of the due process clause. The opinions do not discuss 
problems of notice or opportunity for a hearing-the traditional 
components of procedural due process analysis? Indeed, it is 
92. 42 U.S.C. 9 2210(n) (1976). 
93. 98 S. Ct. at 2640. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 2641. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). The Supreme Court in Fuentes 
stated: 
For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has 
been clear: "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and 
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highly unlikely that a challenge to the Price-Anderson Act on 
procedural due process grounds would be effective. The Act does 
not prevent any injured party from filing a claim and appearing 
before a district court. It only potentially limits the amount of 
recovery in the event that aggregate damages exceed the statu- 
tory limit. All potential plaintiffs will have an opportunity for a 
hearing and will recover some portion of the value of their legiti- 
mate claims as long as the disbursement of funds is properly 
administered by the district court. 
A. The Appropriate Standard of Review 
Before discussing the district court's due process objections 
to the Price-Anderson Act, the Supreme Court paused to deter- 
mine the appropriate standard of review to be applied in the 
case.9g The failure to clearly identify the proper standard of re- 
view was the critical flaw in the district court's analysis. Indeed 
it is surprising, considering the district court's choice to deal with 
the Act on substantive due process grounds, that there was no 
discussion in its opinion of the legislative purpose behind the Act 
or of the relationship between the objectives of the Act and the 
means employed to achieve them. Under traditional substantive 
due process analysis, the court must inquire as to the legitimacy 
of the legislative objective and the reasonableness of the means 
employed to further that objective. As originally stated in Neb bia 
v. New Yo~~,~OO due process "demands only that the law shall not 
be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means se- 
lected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object 
sought to be attained."lol Later cases have indicated, as the Su- 
preme Court in this case reiterated, that this approach affords 
great deference to legislative determinations.ln2 In stark contrast 
to this traditional approach, the district court's opinion made 
virtually no reference to the objectives of the Price-Anderson Act 
and therefore failed to raise the question of whether the means 
employed were reasonably related to the objectives of the Act.lo3 
in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified." . . . It is 
equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard 
"must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 
Id. (citations omitted). 
99. 98 S. Ct. at 2635-36. 
100. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
101. Id. at 525. 
102. 98 S. Ct. at 2635-36. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U S .  1, 
15 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Opt,ical, 
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 
(1952); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937). 
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The Supreme Court, on the other hand, referred constantly 
throughout its opinion to the Act's "dual purpose" of protecting 
the public and encouraging the development of the atomic energy 
industry.lo4 Given such objectives, the Court reasoned that the 
Price-Anderson Act was a clear example of the kind of legislative 
accommodation of "the burdens and benefits of economic life" 
that it had recently declared should be judged by the deferential 
standards developed in earlier substantive due process cases.lo5 
Accordingly, the Court pointed out that the burden was on the 
party claiming the due process violation to show that the legisla- 
tive action was arbitrary or irrational. 
B. Reasonable Compensation for Potential Damages 
The district court's conclusion that the "amount of recovery 
is not rationally related to the potential losses"106 was based solely 
on the observation that the potential damage from a major ca- 
tastrophe could be many times the statutory limit.lo7 The Su- 
preme Court took issue with this overly simplistic analysis and 
examined various factors that justify the establishment of a rea- 
sonable limit on liability. The Court noted, for example, that 
expert opinion as to maximum potential damage was highly spec- 
ulative and that the record indicated the possibility of any inci- 
dent's exceeding the liability limit is extremely remote.lo8 In 
essence, the Court indicated it was proper for the legislature to 
weigh and reasonably accommodate the competing interests of 
the public for assurance of compensation and of private industry 
for a limitation on total liability. The Court then chose not to 
interfere with the policy balance implicit in the legislative enact- 
ment. 
In vindicating the legislatively established limit on liability 
the Court may have overstated its case by relying on the recently 
added language to the Price-Anderson Act that requires Congress 
to intervene and "take whatever action is deemed necessary and 
appropriate" in the event of a nuclear incident involving damages 
in excess of the statutory limit.lo9 Although this proviso is superfi- 
-- 
103. The district court's sole reference to the legislative objectives of the Price- 
Anderson Act appeared in a parenthetical statement during its brief discussion of the 
equal protection issue. 431 F. Supp. at 225. 
104. E.g., 98 S. Ct. at 2626, 2636, 2639. 
105. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). 
106. 431 F. Supp. at 222. 
107. Id. 
108. 98 S. Ct. at 2636-37 & n.28. 
109. 42 U.S.C. 4 2210(e) (1976). 
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cially reassuring, it is doubtful that it contributes in any concrete 
way to the potential relief available to plaintiffs who sustain in- 
jury from a major nuclear catastrophe. In fact, the vague nature 
of the mandate to take "appropriate action" renders the proviso 
virtually meaningless. Furthermore, the language of the proviso 
establishes Congress itself as the ultimate determiner of what 
constitutes "necessary and appropriate" action and thus appears 
to preclude any resort to the courts for review of the appropriate- 
ness of congressional action or inaction. 110 This works to the disad- 
vantage of both potential plaintiffs who might wish to challenge 
an action as insufficient and potential defendants-the owners 
and operators of nuclear power plants-who are left to wonder 
whether an "appropriate" action might include the imposition of 
additional liability. 
Although the Court's reliance on this provision is perhaps 
overemphasized, such reliance does not detract significantly from 
the Court's conclusion that the amount of recovery under the Act 
is reasonably related to the Act's legitimate objectives of protect- 
ing the public and encouraging the development of the nuclear 
power industry. The significance of the Court's opinion on this 
point lies in its recognition tha t  the pondering of 
"imp~nderables"~~~ and the weighing of competing interests is a 
matter properly left to the discretion of the legislative branch. A 
decision made by Congress should not be judicially supplanted 
absent a showing that it was arbitrary or irrational and therefore 
unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective. 
C. Limited Liability and the Encouragement of Irresponsibility 
The district court's second due process objection to the Act 
was that it tends to encourage irresponsibility in the construction 
and operation of reactor sites.l12 In making this conclusion the 
court considered only the economic incentives that might encour- 
-- 
110. The specific language of the proviso reads: 
Provided, That in the event of a nuclear incident involving damages in excess 
of that amount of aggregate liability, the Congress will thoroughly review the 
particular incident and will take whatever action is deemed necessary and ap- 
propriate to protect the public from the consequences of a disaster of such 
magnitude . . . . 
Id. 
111. 98 S. Ct. at  2637-38. The Court made reference to such "imponderables" as the 
remoteness of the possibility of a major catastrophe and the necessity of choosing a figure 
high enough to provide the public reasonable assurance of some compensation for injuries 
yet low enough to allay the fears of private developers of nuclear power. 
112. 431 I?. Supp. a t  222. 
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age or discourage responsibility in the nuclear power industry. 
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, correctly noted that in 
addition to these economic incentives the strict statutory require- 
ments of the Atomic Energy Act are designed specifically to deal 
with the concerns of reactor safety and environmental protec- 
tion.Il3 The Act is replete with provisions requiring the NRC to 
promulgate safety standards and ensure that those standards are 
met by NRC licensees. 114 
The Supreme Court might also have noted that upon its 
creation in 1971 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was 
specifically authorized to impose strict standards on licensees of 
the NRC.l15 The safety record of the industry over its brief life- 
span indicates that the NRC and its licensees have adhered well 
to government standards116 and that, apparently, there is little 
need for the economic incentives envisioned by the district court. 
In any event, since only NRC licensees may construct or operate 
reactor sites and since all such licensees are subject to the strict 
regulation of the NRC and the EPA, the Supreme Court had 
substantial justification for concluding that the tendency to irres- 
ponsibility noted by the district court is effectively curbed by 
comprehensive governmental regulation of the nuclear power in- 
dustry. 
D. Balancing of Burdens and Benefits-The Reasonably Just 
Substitute Test 
In its third and final due process criticism of the Price- 
Anderson Act, the district court found that the limit on total 
liability benefited NRC licensees without exacting a significant 
113. 42 U.S.C. §$ 2011-2296 (1976). In its statement of purpose, the Act proclaims: 
I t  is the purpose of this chapter to effectuate the policies set forth above by 
providing for- 
. . . 
(d) a program to encourage widespread participation in the development 
and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent 
consistent with the common defense and security and with the health and safety 
of the public . . . . 
Id. a t  § 2013(d). See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 98 S. Ct. 1197, 
1203 (1978). 
114. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (1976) (conditions for issuance of a commercial license); 
Id. 9 2201 (general duties of the Commission); Id. 8 2232 (requirements for license applica- 
tion); Id. 15 2236 (allowing revocation of license for failure to observe safety standards); 
Id. 9 2241 (establishing Atomic Safety Licensing Board). 
115. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072, 1073 (1966-1970 Compilat.ion), 
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., a t  827, 828 (1976). 
116. Marrone, The Price-Anderson Act: The Insurance Industry's View, 12 FORUM 
605, 609-11 (1977). 
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quid pro quo from the licensees.l17 The district court's failure to 
determine a t  the outset the appropriate standard of review 
caused it to depart significantly from traditional analysis and to 
tip the scales of its balancing test in such a way as to find the 
Price-Anderson Act unconstitutionally advantageous to the de- 
fendants. 
The problem was largely one of assigning the burden of proof 
to the wrong party..The district court seized upon language from 
Cherokee Nation and the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases 
and required the defendant to show that the statutory scheme 
afforded "reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtain- 
ing compen~ation."~~~ By imposing the strict Cherokee Nation 
standard, the court in essence shifted the responsibility to the 
defendant to show the constitutionality of the Act. 
In contrast, the Supreme Court determined that the burden 
properly rests with the party challenging the Act on substantive 
due process grounds to show that the legislation is arbitrary or 
unreasonable. Therefore, while the district court had loaded its 
scale in favor of the challengers, the Supreme Court tilted its own 
in favor of the constitutionality of the Act. In both courts the 
outcome of the balancing test was largely determined by the 
weighting of the scales. 
In the process of applying its balancing test, the Supreme 
Court resurrected the "reasonably just substitute" test developed 
years earlier in New York Central Railroad v. White1lD and 
Crowell v. Benson. 120 While the district court had devoted consid- 
erable discussion to the exchange of burdens and benefits effected 
by the provisions of the Act, the Supreme Court directed its anal- 
ysis to the more narrow question of whether the Act provides a 
reasonably just substitute for the common law or state tort law 
remedies it replaces. 121 
In reaching the determination that the Price-Anderson com- 
pensation scheme provides a reasonable substitute remedy, the 
Court relied heavily on the one aspect of the legislative scheme 
that the district court had totally overlooked-that in furtherance 
of its stated objective to "protect the public" the Act is designed 
to provide a guaranteed minimum fund from which recovery can 
be made following a major catastrophe. As commentators have 
117. 431 F. Supp. at 223. 
118. Id. at 224. 
119. 243 U.S. 188 (1917). 
120. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
121. 98 S. Ct. at 2638-41. 
776 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1978: 
notedln and common sense dictates, allowing unlimited recovery 
under common law principles does not ensure that funds will be 
available to satisfy judgments against the tortfeasor. Since at the 
time of initial passage of the Act liability insurance was only 
available to the nuclear power industry in a limited amount,123 
the Act provided a mechanism whereby the public would be guar- 
anteed recovery up to a reasonable limit. This crucial aspect of 
the Price-Anderson Act and the bearing it has on the reasonable- 
ness of the substitute remedy provided by the Act was apparently 
never considered by the district court. 
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, devoted considerable 
time to a discussion of this congressional assurance of recovery. 
The Court, in fact, treated in only the most cursory manner the 
multiple factors enumerated in the district court's opinion as 
contributing to the conclusion that there was no quid pro quo? 
By choosing to limit itself to a consideration of whether the Act 
provides a reasonably just substitute remedy, the Supreme Court 
refused to embark on the perilous course traveled by the district 
court in its multifactored approach to the balancing test. Thus, 
the Court laid to rest any speculation that in the realm of legisla- 
tively created compensation schemes the traditionally deferential 
standards of substantive due process analysis might give way to 
a less deferential and consequently more highly interventionist 
standard of review. The Court essentially outlined a safe harbor 
for legislators, putting them on notice that modifications of com- 
mon law compensation schemes will continue to pass muster 
under the due process clause as long as the legislation provides a 
substitute remedy that is "reasonably just." A scheme that sub- 
stitutes the certainty of some recovery, albeit limited, for the 
possibility of no recovery whatsoever is, in the Court's opinion, 
"reasonably just ." 
122. E.g., Lowenstein, supra note 19, a t  602. Lowenstein states: 
Finally, it should be noted that the right to sue abo4e the limit of liability 
would not assure the ability to  collect. Since the waiver of defenses by persons 
sued would not apply above the amount of insurance and indemnity available, 
it might take years to reach a final adjudication in the courts and even then 
there is no assurance that persons adjudicated to be liable would have resources 
to pay judgments. 
Id. 
123. Marrone, supra note 116, a t  607. 
124. 431 F. Supp. a t  223-24. The district court considered, among other factors, the 
relative merits of Price-Anderson strict liability, the effectiveness of the Act's bankruptcy- 
type provisions for distribution of funds, the impact of the Act's extension of stat.ut.es of 
limitation, and the uncertain nature of the Act's proviso requiring Congress to take furt.her 
appropriate action in the event of a major nuclear catastrophe. Id. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that the provisions of the Price-Anderson 
Act have historically been the subject of much controversy out- 
side the courtroom.125 Aside from the case at hand, however, no 
reported cases can be found in which the Act's constitutionality 
has been challenged. This is probably due to the standing and 
ripeness difficulties encountered by litigants in challenging a 
statute that does nbt purport to adversely affect any compensa- 
tion for damages less than $560 million in the aggregate. There 
have been no claims alleging damages in excess of the $560 mil- 
lion limit. Those who criticize the Act base their criticism largely 
upon opposition to nuclear power in general rather than to the 
theoretical construct of the Act itself. However, when opponents 
have engaged in some sort of legal analysis of the provisions of the 
Act, the due process clause is most often seen as the likely tool 
for declaring the Act to be inva1id.l" This case represents the first 
reasoned analysis by the courts of the due process issue so often 
invoked by opponents of Price-Anderson and nuclear power. 
The district court's analysis suffered in a t  least two highly 
significant respects. First of all, the court imposed on the defen- 
dants the heavy burden of showing that the Act afforded 
"reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining com- 
pensation," a standard premised on the just compensation clause 
and only applied previously to situations in which a taking of 
vested private property interests for public use was a t  issue. Had 
the court used the traditional standard and required the plaintiff 
to show that the Act was arbitrary and unreasonable, there is 
little doubt that the court's balancing process would have been 
significantly altered. 
The district court also neglected to seek out and thoughtfully 
consider the stated objectives of the Price-Anderson Act. In par- 
ticular, the court failed to recognize the crucial point that one of 
the primary purposes of the Act was to protect the public by 
guaranteeing a substantial fund from which claims for damages 
resulting from a major nuclear incident could be satisfied, regard- 
less of the solvency of the tortfeasor. This oversight contributed 
significantly to the court's seeming predisposition to find the Act 
unconstitutional. 
125. See, e.g., Collier, supra note 30; Comment, The Irradiated Plaintiff: Tort Recov- 
ery Outside Price-Anderson, 6 ENVT'L L. 859 (1976); Note, the "Extraordinary Nuclear 
Occurrence" Threshold and Uncompensated Injury Under the Price-Anderson Act, 6 
RUT.-CAM. L.J. 360 (1974). 
126. See, e.g., Collier, supra note 30, at 249-68. 
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The Supreme Court's opinion is at least as significant for 
what it chose not to do as for what it did do. The Court staunchly 
resisted the invitation to abandon the deferential postdepression 
standards of substantive due process analysis in economic mat- 
ters. Instead, the Court resurrected and reaffirmed the reasonably 
just substitute test developed in New York Central Railroad v.  
Whiteln and crowell v .  B e n ~ o n l ~ ~  as a safe harbor for legislative 
modifications of common law compensation schemes. 
On a more practical level, the Court laid to rest doubts con- 
cerning the continued vitality of the Price-Anderson Act as a tool 
for encouraging private development of nuclear power while at 
the same time assuring a source of funds from which public liabil- 
ity claims may be satisfied in the event of a major nuclear inci- 
dent. Although many will insist that the Court should have dis- 
missed the case for lack of standing, ripeness, or subject matter 
jurisdiction, the fact remains that the Court did deal with the 
case on its merits and has thereby removed the cloud of uncer- 
tainty that had descended upon the nuclear power industry since 
the district court's decision. 
David M. Connors 
127. 243 U.S. 188 (1917). 
128. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
